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The Violence of Curiosity: Butler’s 
Foucault, Foucault’s Herculine, and the 
Will-to-Know
Lauren Guilmette
As it is known, a doctor enjoys certain privileges with a sick 
person that nobody dreams of contesting. . . . His face was 
distorted, betraying extraordinary excitement. “I beg you to leave 
me alone,” I said to him. “You are killing me!” “Mademoiselle,” 
he answered, ‘I’m asking you for just one minute, and it will be 
finished.’ His hand was already slipping under my sheet and 
coming to a stop at the sensitive place. It pressed upon it several 
times, as if to find there the solution to a difficult problem. It did 
not leave off at that point! ! !
—Herculine Barbin, My Memoirs, 68
As for what motivated me, it is quite simple; I would hope that 
in the eyes of some people it might be sufficient in itself. It was 
curiosity—the only kind of curiosity, in any case, that is worth 
acting upon with a degree of obstinacy: not the curiosity that 
seeks to assimilate what it is proper for one to know, but that 
which enables one to get free of oneself.
—Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume Two, 8
Nearly eight years passed between volumes one and two of Michel 
Foucault’s History of Sexuality, during which—among other projects—he 
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mimicked Plutarch’s pairings of Romans and Greeks, the parallel trajectories 
of great men and, thus, studies in the inf luence of virtue on destiny. By 
contrast, Foucault’s prefatory essay to the series, “Lives of Infamous Men” 
(1977), turns to those liminal f igures who “no longer exist except through 
the terrible words that were destined to render them forever unworthy of 
the memory of men” (164). Here, in the Parisian archive where he once 
researched History of Madness (1961), Foucault considers the mode of curi-
osity drawing him to those judged and forgotten by history, the impossibility 
of recollecting them fully, and the transformations of thinking and feeling 
they enable in their strangeness. Foucault completed two volumes of the 
Parallel Lives series: Le Désordre de families, coedited with historian Arlette 
Farge,1 and the volume of my focus here, Herculine Barbin: Being the Recently 
Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century French Hermaphrodite (1978, 
translated with a new preface in 1980 ; hereafter cited as HB). This singular 
work assembled memoirs, medical and legal documents, and f ictitious 
renderings of a female-identif ied intersex adolescent who went by Alexina 
until s/he found h/erself the object of medical-moral inquiry. Foucault’s 
preface contextualizes his assembled documents, found in the archives of the 
Department of Public Hygiene, with the signif icance of Alexina’s historical 
moment—the 1860s—as a period of intensif ied research, poking and prod-
ding into the “truth” of sexual identity.
In Gender Trouble (1990 ; hereafter cited as GT), Judith Butler criticizes 
Foucault ’s preface for romanticizing in Alexina’s case a pre-discursive 
 sexuality—a time in her life before the medical and legal enforcement 
made it their concern to discover or “pin down” h/er “true sex” (GT 120). 
Butler writes that, in taking Herculine’s early experience to be “outside all 
convention,” Foucault naively exhibits “sentimental indulgence in the very 
emancipatory discourse his analysis in The History of Sexuality was meant to 
displace” (GT 123). That is, in Butler’s opinion, Herculine Barbin exhibits 
an error in Foucault’s thought—a misstep at best, but a threat to the genea-
logical project on sexuality at its worst. Butler’s critique of the Herculine 
project went largely unchallenged—with the notable exception of Ladelle 
McWhorter’s (1999) account of the text as a plurivocal “counter-memory”2—
until the past few years; here, my thinking is enriched by the work of Chloë 
Taylor (2010), Johanna Oksala (2011), and Jemima Repo (2014), among 
others. Building upon the insights of these authors, who have begun to 
question, for instance, Butler’s (non-) relationship to biopower, this article 
returns to Butler’s early critique of Herculine in order to recover a project 
covered over by that critique, and thus covered over in a range of scholarship 
that takes its bearing from Butler’s early work. Here, I argue that the early 
Butler not only misses but also arguably transgresses the ethical stakes of 
Foucault’s Herculine volume when she dismisses the work as little more than 
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a parallel confession between “Herculine Barbin” and Foucault himself. 
Contra the early Butler, I interpret Herculine Barbin as continuous with 
Foucault’s History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge (1976) in its concern 
with the affective framing of la volonté de savoir, the will to know, especially 
when it pertains to what is strange or unfamiliar.
Butler is, however, not irredeemable on this point. While more recent 
feminist theorists have criticized Butler’s account concerning ontological 
questions of sex and gender, I find that Butler herself, in her ethical turn3 to 
the differential distributions of precarity and grievability, does offer a distinc-
tive lens through which one could return to Herculine Barbin anew, and this 
is the concluding section of the work I will do here. The later Butler shares 
with this supposedly marginal Foucault a thematic concern with how we take 
interest in the lives of others, regarded in their strange complexity—especially 
with what I call the “violence of curiosity,” as the affective frame of modern 
biopolitics. As I will argue in what follows, this later Butler might differently 
register Foucault’s attention to this memoir, particularly his explicit contextu-
alization of that memoir with medical and legal documents and with fictions 
concerning the same person’s life. In the tensions of these documents, Foucault 
draws our attention to aspects of a cultural frame that made the particular life 
addressed within these pages impossible, unlivable, and, at the time of h/er 
death, ungrievable.
*
During h/er short life, Herculine Barbin went by “Alexina” (and sometimes 
Camille), living as a woman in a convent school—as s/he writes, “in the 
delicious calm of religious houses” (HB 3). In h/er early twenties, however, 
a medical visit led to a “discovery” that would rename Alexina as “Abel,” 
casting h/er out of all previously known institutional relations and social 
bonds. Alexina grew up poor, the daughter of a provincial housekeeper in 
“the small town of L.,” h/er father having passed away soon after h/er birth. 
By the generosity of “Mother Superior” and the inf luence of a “distinguished 
lawyer” in this small town, Alexina was received into an orphanage at the 
age of seven, after which s/he was raised in convent schools, in the care of 
strangers (HB 5–7). After some time serving as a lady’s maid, Alexina came to 
work as a schoolmistress in a convent school (HB 20–22). There, s/he taught 
and lived alongside young women, though s/he became increasingly aware of 
h/er bodily differences from her peers and hid those differences accordingly; 
Alexina describes h/er distress at communal living, “instinctively ashamed” 
of h/er bodily differences, body hair, and hardness where others exhibited 
softness and new curves (HB 26–27). Alexina also grew increasingly aware 
of h/er desires for other women, from h/er friend Thécla to h/er teacher, 
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Sister Marie-des-Anges (HB 28–32), and eventually, s/he became lovers 
with another schoolmistress, Mademoiselle Sara, daughter of the director of 
the convent boarding school (HB 42–52). During these early years, Alexina 
avoided the surveillance of the parish priest (whom s/he quickly discerned 
as a future enemy) and the increasing curiosity of others in the convent and 
local town (HB 54–57), though eventually a recurring abdominal pain led h/
er to visit a doctor at Sara’s insistence (HB 67). This medical examination led 
to others, which, along with a series of confessions, led to the designation of 
a medical “error” in need of legal correction in civil status. I will return to 
the scene of Barbin’s medical examinations at some length in my analysis of 
the ethical stakes of the volume, which comes to light not through Foucault’s 
preface but through a consideration of the assembled medical dossier, which 
Foucault includes without specif ic commentary. It bears noting that Barbin 
is also insistently and, I f ind, resistantly silent about these examinations in 
her own writing, alerting the reader to the pain these examinations caused 
and the unrelenting curiosity of h/er examiners.
Indeed, Foucault’s assembled corpus of documents, in their plurality, itself 
speaks to a lack of cohesion that should be seen as characteristic of Herculine 
Barbin’s “infamous” life. Barbin committed suicide in 1868, at the age of thirty, 
leaving behind the manuscript of h/er memoirs; this manuscript eventually 
found its way in partial form, via Auguste Tardieu’s 1874 Question médico-légale 
de l ’ identité, to the Parisian archives of the Department of Public Hygiene, 
where Foucault found it a century later. Foucault also includes Oscar Panizza’s 
1893 fiction about Alexina, “A Scandal at the Convent.” The non-compossibility 
of these accounts should signal to the careful reader that something similar 
belongs to this troubled life as well. The ethical question raised in regard to 
such a “case,” and raised by Foucault in the character of the Herculine text, then 
shows itself as remarkably similar to the ethical questions raised by such a life. 
Or rather, it raises the question of whether there can be, in this or any case, 
any such thing as a life itself—whether this life, or any, apart from being made 
into a “case” for the violence of medical and legal curiosity, can be considered 
to hold any truth. Butler’s claim that the text should be encountered as a veiled 
confession of Foucault’s own sexual truth, then, would not simply be dismissive, 
but violently so.
The last years of Barbin’s life were marked by loneliness and suffering, torn 
from the relations that once sustained h/er through anxiety and discomfort. 
As Chloë Taylor aptly summarizes, Barbin voluntarily gave three confes-
sions to priests and underwent three voluntary medical examinations because 
s/he had “faith in confession as an unburdening of her/his soul, and also 
had faith in medical practitioners. . . . Later, however, in the aftermath 
of her/his change in civil status,” Barbin would come to regret this faith 
and f ind h/erself punished “cruelly” for it (Taylor 2010, 221). Geertje Mak 
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observes that this  punishment entailed social dislocation and, with a change 
of name and clothing, the enforcement of masculine cultural scripts in which 
Barbin felt ill at ease, unable to make the romantic connections that once 
motivated and organized h/er lived experience (Mak 2012, 85). Bemoaning 
h/er fate, Barbin writes: “My inexperience prepared me only for sadness and 
disillusionment. I saw everything then in a light that was radiant and free 
of clouds. Poor fool that I was! I possessed happiness, true felicity, and with 
gaiety of heart I was going to sacrif ice all that—for what? For an idea, a 
stupid fear! ! ! Oh! I have thoroughly atoned for my folly. . . . Many people 
will laugh. I pardon them, and I hope they shall never know the nameless 
sorrows that have overwhelmed me! ! ! ” (HB 85). Subjected to scandalous 
rumors and consigned to “that half of the human race which is called the 
stronger sex” (HB 89), Barbin had to leave all previously familiar sites of 
community for the anonymity of Paris, where s/he sought work unsuccess-
fully as a man and lived in poverty and isolation. Margaret McLaren notes 
that, here, Barbin was perceived as too weak for servant work and, now 
identified as male, s/he could not call upon h/er earlier experience as a lady’s 
maid: “When Herculine was a woman, she was too strong, too gawky, too 
tall, too masculine. But when she was a man, she was too soft, too weak, 
too feminine. But her body and appearance were the same” (McLaren 2002, 
132). Indeed, in these last years, Barbin came to see h/erself as transcending 
both genders; Taylor (2010) observes, “Barbin now denies that s/he has any 
sex at all, insistent that s/he is not a ‘degraded man’ . . . [but] an angel, one 
of those sexless, androgynous beings . . . pure soul” (222–23).
However, this air of transcendence seems to have been fragile in comparison 
to the medical and legal curiosity that silently pursued her even into these 
depths of solitude. Before committing suicide, Barbin was haunted by thoughts 
about the future of h/er body, which would, she surmised, fall into the eager 
grip of medical experts upon her death:
When that day comes a few doctors will make a little stir around my corpse; 
they will shatter all the extinct mechanisms of its impulses, will draw new 
information from it, will analyze all the mysterious sufferings that were heaped 
upon a single human being. O princes of science, enlightened chemists, who 
names resound throughout the world, analyze then, if that is possible, all the 
sorrows that have burned, devoured this heart down to its last fibers; all the 
scalding tears that have drowned it, squeezed it dry in their savage grasp! 
(HB 103)
Much as Barbin foresaw, h/er case history would become an object ripe 
for medical, psychiatric, and literary “medico-libertine” analysis in the late 
 nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Foucault demonstrates the fulfillment 
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of this fear through his inclusion of the appended medical documents and 
Panizza’s “A Scandal at the Convent.” Turning now to Judith Butler’s critique 
of Herculine Barbin, I note from the start that she does not engage these 
appended documents, and that this omission profoundly limits Butler’s reading 
of Foucault on the emerging modern relation of “sex” and “truth.” Butler’s 
limited engagement with these equally important elements of Herculine limits 
her analysis of Foucault’s purpose and causes her to miss the ethical question 
Foucault raises by their inclusion.
*
Butler’s dismissive analysis occurs in the second section of chapter 3 in Gender 
Trouble (1990), entitled “Foucault, Herculine, and the politics of sexual discon-
tinuity.” To avoid replicating the practice of a dismissive critique, therefore, 
we must first note the stakes of the work that frames Butler’s critique. In this 
landmark text, Butler works to unravel foundationalist fictions of “woman” 
as the subject of feminism, by drawing on Foucault’s theories of power and 
discourse, specifically his claim that “ juridical systems of power produce the 
subjects they subsequently come to represent” (GT 4).4 Beyond controlling or 
repressing women, Butler argues, juridical systems of power in fact constitute 
the category “woman.” Insofar as the process of becoming a subject depends 
upon norms and social categories for intelligibility, the subjectification, for 
Butler, is inextricable from subordination.5 She argues that sex is “constructed 
through a historically specific mode of sexuality,” compulsory heterosexuality,6 
which teaches one how one must comport, discipline, and understand oneself. 
This renders a particular set of relations stable and even natural “as part of a 
strategy to conceal and, hence, to perpetuate power relations” (GT 31, 121). 
When we take sex for granted as the backdrop of politics, we further naturalize 
a regime of power-knowledge; thus, Butler concludes that we must reject “sex” 
as a self-identical substance and of “gender” as a form of being, and take it up 
instead always as a kind of doing. Anatomy, in other words, is not destiny. 
Given the discursive, constructive nature of subjectification, Butler argues that 
there is no doer behind the deed, no sex behind the gender. Because we cannot 
escape the perceptual frames and terms we have inherited, Butler turns to 
Foucault’s History of Sexuality Volume One (1976) in search of sites of “subversion 
from within the terms of the law” (GT 119).
Having adopted Foucault as a new possible orientation to rethink resistance, 
Butler nevertheless follows him to (what she perceives as) his own failure to 
maintain this critical rigor in Herculine Barbin. In a move that is as surprising as 
it is blunt, Butler distinguishes what she calls the “official” Foucault of Sexuality 
Volume One from his preface to Herculine, in which she locates “the opportu-
nity to read Foucault against himself ” (GT 124). While she reads Sexuality 
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Volume One as compatible with her own psychoanalytic framework—where 
one can only be recognized as a subject through a gendered identity presumed 
heterosexual in its desires—in Herculine Barbin, Butler finds a problematic 
romanticism of polymorphous sexual freedom. To Butler, the Foucault of 
Herculine Barbin sounds like Rousseau appealing to a benevolent “state of 
nature,” which depicts Alexina’s convent life as a “natural heterogeneity” 
among women, a queer freedom before or beyond the repressive patriarchal 
gaze. This reading, while possible in light of Herculine’s own reflections, is 
not the proper affect of Foucault’s total presentation. While Butler insists on 
the predominance of the “cultural” over the “natural” in her deconstruction of 
the sex/gender distinction, Foucault himself resists recourse to this dualism; 
as Jemima Repo (2014) writes, Butler’s interpretation of Herculine Barbin sits 
in tension with Foucault as a de-historicized “gender ontology” rather than a 
genealogy.7 As Repo argues:
Foucault ’s analyses do not analytically differentiate between “nature” 
and “culture” . . . [both of which] are ordered by scientific knowledge 
 production. . . . The control over sex therefore is not cultural, for Foucault, 
but biopolitical. It is not determined by cultural norms, but by the strategy to 
gain control over life.” (Repo 2014, 75)
Questions of sex and gender, so vital to Anglo-American feminist theory, in 
no small part because of Butler, fall under a single term for Foucault, le sexe. 
Thus, while Butler argues that sex (like gender) is always already discursive, 
Foucault did not problematize sex in this way; instead, Foucault claimed sex is 
imaginary. As Johanna Oksala writes: “he was not arguing that femaleness is 
imaginary, ideal, or arbitrary. Rather, he was trying to problematize a certain 
kind of explanatory framework of sexuality: the idea of a foundation or an 
invisible cause that supports the visible effects” (Oksala 2005, 116).
Geertje Mak (2012) has more recently written of Foucault’s Herculine text as 
though it explicitly theorized the relation between the biological and the social 
in nineteenth-century human sciences, arguing that Foucault misdiagnoses the 
search for a “true sex” when, “both for the physicians involved and for Barbin 
himself [sic], sex was a social and moral position rather than an expression of 
individual [sexual] identity” (18).8 Much like Butler in this regard, Mak claims 
that her own reading of Herculine better aligns with the “official” voice of 
Foucault’s work, and she continues (though one may wonder whom she takes 
to disagree with her) that the question of a pre-discursive sexuality is “quite 
ahistorical” and fails to properly explore “the question of what the category 
of sex actually meant to Barbin—of how, exactly, sex and self are connected 
(or not connected) in his [sic] memoirs” (Mak 2012, 67). Intentional fallacy 
aside, one can appreciate Mak’s interest in the historical formation of “sex” and 
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“truth” in modern subjectivity; yet, she arguably follows the early Butler here in 
missing the significance of Foucault’s Herculine as an ethical exercise. Against 
Mak, I would argue that Foucault was explicitly not concerned with discov-
ering what Barbin really thought but, rather, with the interplay of memoir, 
medical, and fictional documents. Foucault’s volume is not much interested in 
whether the nineteenth-century hermaphrodite was understood as an “interior” 
biological condition or an “inscribed” cultural condition of a moral, legal, and 
social order; rather, I argue, Foucault’s Herculine volume can serve as a site 
for highlighting the emergence of a violent curiosity animating “the will to 
knowledge,” a cruelty that one senses in the fissures between memoirs, medical 
reports, and fictions—in their shuddering silences and discursive excesses.
*
I believe Butler missteps in her analysis, in fact, because she is intent on reading 
the Herculine text as a moment in which Foucault lays his own autobiographical 
context overtop of Barbin’s in a moment of confessional weakness. In reading 
the preface and the memoirs (without the dossier or novella), Butler takes 
Foucault to endorse Alexina’s nostalgia in h/er memoirs for the convent as 
evidence of romanticizing a pre-discursive sexuality, and she suggests that he 
“ joins with Herculine in taking h/er sexuality to be outside all convention,” 
and, in this “sentimental” and “didactic” presentation of “Herculine’s” life, that 
he somehow confesses something; she writes:
Foucault, who gave only one interview on homosexuality and has always 
resisted the confessional moment in his own work, nevertheless presents 
Herculine’s confession to us in an unabashedly didactic mode. Is this a 
displaced confession that presumes a continuity or parallel between his life 
and hers? (GT 129)
Yet, I believe this move is a narrowly focused reach. Foucault’s “one inter-
view on homosexuality” never discusses his own homosexuality but the gay 
movement more broadly. Butler gains traction for this move by interpreting 
the Plutarch epigraph about “parallel lives” as a parallel between the lives of 
“Herculine” and Foucault himself. She writes, “in the sense in which diver-
gent lifelines, which are in no sense ‘straight,’ might well be . . . not in any 
literal sense, but in their very contestation of the literal as such, especially 
as it applies to the categories of sex” (GT 129). From Foucault’s suggestion 
that we might learn from the experiences of Herculine Barbin, Butler deems 
his framing in the preface not only “unabashedly didactic” but furthermore 
a “displaced confession” that ties his intimate life to that of Herculine. The 
majority of feminist accounts that engage Butler’s analysis here, however, fail to 
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ask what, precisely, Butler implies Foucault is confessing.9 Is it an  affirmation 
of ambiguity? An ambivalent desire for a queer identity, which associates 
homosexuality with “an unnamable libidinal heterogeneity . . . a love that 
either cannot or dare not speak its name?” I wonder whether Butler herself 
would be able to say, or whether it constitutes another moment of suggestive 
thought that others have subsequently taken to be a precise, rhetorical question. 
Although the question clearly has something to do with his intimate sexual 
practices—about which, she notes, he said little—Butler herself ultimately 
leaves the matter ambiguous. This gesture, in its implied exposure of Foucault 
as sentimental confessor, however, is narrow and dismissive insofar as it fails 
to address the larger ethical concerns clearly raised by the Parallel Lives series 
of which Herculine was part, concerns about the violence of the will-to-
know—a framework in which the desire to label one as an abashed confessor 
is one important tactic.
In her 1990 critique, then, I find that Butler takes herself to be correcting a 
sentimental figure—“a happy dispersal of these various functions,  meanings, 
organs, somatic and physiological processes” (GT 123)—and, in turn, analyzing 
Herculine through the “ juridical law of the incest taboo . . . [which] insti-
gates and maintains heterosexuality by forbidding the love of the mother 
and encouraging identification with the father” (Repo 2014, 77). Basing her 
critique heavily on Foucault’s description of Barbin’s time in the convent as 
a “happy limbo of non-identity,” Butler insists that there could have been no 
such moment preceding the imposition of “the law,” because desire (understood 
psychoanalytically as lack) can only arise for Butler through prohibitive laws 
(GT 134). Thus, shaped by the prohibition of maternal love through the repres-
sive law of the incest taboo, Barbin’s time in the convent is not “outside the law” 
but, in fact, structured by this law as s/he moves from “mother” to “mother” 
and then falls in love with various mothers’ “daughters” (GT 132–33; see also 
Repo 2014, 79). Yet, this analysis relies on a slim understanding of the context 
(i.e., the convent) in which this so-called limbo exists.
As I elaborate in the following section, the relative freedom available to 
Barbin in the convent was, rather, the product of paradoxically enabling limita-
tions within the confines of convent life, in women-only spaces subject to—but 
not yet fully mastered by—the gazes of various authoritative men. This problem 
of a “happy limbo” in Herculine Barbin—a pre-discursive sexuality before the 
imposition of the law—is not so much Foucault’s problem as the effect of 
framing this text at a particular moment in gender studies scholarship—one 
in which recourse to psychoanalytic framing constitutes an historical anach-
ronism that, while a matter of course for the discursive milieu from which 
Butler produces her critique, is not endemic to the milieu in which Barbin 
encapsulates h/er experience, nor to the one out of which Foucault assembles 
the Herculine text.
10   philoSophia
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*
Quite distinct from Butler’s suspicions that he romanticizes lesbianism in the 
convent, McLaren (2002) faults Foucault from the other side for failing to 
engage the “satisfying lesbian relationships” preceding Herculine’s sex reas-
signment. McLaren finds that Foucault thus “renders lesbian existence invisible 
or impossible” and overlooks that the “moral interest” motivating the demand 
to clarify ambiguities of sex is, she claims, ultimately the deterrence of homo-
sexuality (134). While McLaren rightly observes that Barbin’s ambiguous body 
was intolerable in a culture insistent upon dichotomous gender categories, and 
while it has been well documented by feminist readers that Foucault wrote little 
about women and specifically gendered forms of oppression,10 it is this objection 
to Foucault’s Herculine (rather than Foucault’s text itself) that might warrant 
Butler’s objection to a “happy limbo of non-identity” preceding the imposition 
of medical-moral (masculine) authority.
If a “happy limbo of non-identity” has been romanticized by any voice in 
this volume, surely it is Alexina h/erself, who describes h/er childhood as 
“that age when everything is beautiful, because everything is young and bright 
with the future,” protected “in the delicious calm of religious houses” (HB 3). 
Profoundly shaped by literary conventions of French Romanticism, the relative 
sexual freedom Barbin finds in the convent is not free of cultural norms and 
imperatives but, indeed, made possible through these conventions, especially 
the Romantic sublimation of “the particularities of bodies and organs to the 
loftier expressions of romantic love” (Taylor 2010, 225). Yet, arguably, the target 
of Butler’s critique is Foucault’s comparison of the changing medical-legal 
treatment given to the “hermaphrodite” before and after the 1860s.11 Earlier, 
Foucault notes, hermaphrodites could pick a gender at the time of marriage 
as long as they kept “the sex they had then declared until the end of their 
lives”; it was changing one’s mind (rather than any “anatomical mixture of the 
sexes”) that led to condemnations in medieval and Renaissance-era France (HB 
viii). By contrast, the subject of these nineteenth-century techniques is not 
the juridical subject of law, not the guilty moral monster but the biopolitical 
patient: the “Tom Thumb” whose symptoms fall on a grid of abnormality. He 
thus writes that “nobody in Alexina’s feminine milieu consented to play that 
difficult game of truth which the doctors later imposed on h/er indeterminate 
anatomy, until a discovery that everybody delayed for as long as possible was 
finally precipitated by two men, a priest and a doctor” (HB xii). Perhaps due 
to Victorian modesty, perhaps due to the conventions of the boarding school, 
perhaps because Alexina was an exceptional student, no curiosity mingled 
with their fondness for h/er (HB 27). To apply the terms of History of Sexuality 
Volume One, institutional presumptions of femininity and virtues of modesty 
in the convent provided Alexina with a “relatively obscure area of tolerance” 
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(HS 101). This tolerance, therefore, far from being a polymorphous sexual 
free-for-all, required silence and hushed communication; thus, h/er relation 
to Sara skirts below speech, as when s/he confesses: “I feel from now on this 
affection cannot be enough for me! I would have to have your whole life!!!” 
Sara, “struck by the strangeness” of these words, does “not try to give them an 
impossible meaning,” but instead worries that they might wake the students. 
Barbin only writes, “She squeezed my hand, letting me understand that I was 
pardoned” (HB 50).
The feminine space of the convent—internal to the church and yet 
obscured from men. To be sure, this is not a space free from the law but, 
in Barbin’s historical moment, at least, it is not clearly a space for which a 
psychoanalytic reading is appropriate either. It exists as one moment—for 
Foucault, likely, an exemplary one—in which the historical movement from 
legal-juridical power to biopower f inds its intermediary stage. To formulate 
this movement, we might begin by recalling Foucault’s February 1975 lecture 
(Abnormal, hereafter AB), which plays upon the difference between the 
categories of the witch and the convulsing nun. These two designations 
for the abnormal female exist on different sides of the epistemic divide 
between juridical and pastoral power. The witch, on the one hand, lives 
on the outskirts of the village; the juridical subject of “guilt” and “evil,” 
she may be burned at the stake for exchanging her soul for power (AB 205, 
210). By contrast, the convulsing nun is not a juridical subject; rather, she 
emerges from new techniques of spiritual direction following the counter-
Reformation. The possessed nun is thus a site of “carnal disorder” rather 
than the juridical subject of guilt, and the nun’s body convulses because it 
battles with a competing force rather than occupying it of her own accord; 
at once, she resists the occupation of her f lesh by the devil and “counters the 
rule of obedient direction with intense shocks of involuntary revolt or little 
betrayals of secret connivance” (AB 213). Importantly, she differs from the 
witch in that she is not condemned, not responsible for her convulsions, but 
because of this innocence, she is made subject to the subtlest interventions 
of experts on her behalf. Alexina, who f inds herself from the earliest age in 
the grip of pastoral power, is thus never accorded guilt for her condition, 
but in this historical moment, h/er subjectivity is not simply spiritual either. 
For Foucault, in fact, s/he exemplif ies something of a fulcrum point in the 
transformation from the spiritual subject of a pastoral power to the medical 
subject of a biopolitical regime. S/he lives and writes on the threshold 
of a further epistemic shift, her body itself exemplifying a fading site of 
obscurity in the consolidation of biopower, at a moment when the regime 
of pastoral power cedes the convulsions and desires of the f lesh to medical 
and psychiatric experts. As Mark D. Jordan writes in Convulsing Bodies 
(2015), this is a power that cares, demanding candor and obedience and 
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professing “not to be interested in conquest or punishment so much as the 
promotion of f lourishing,” from the attainment of salvation to that of health 
(125). While deployed differently, the emerging sciences of abnormality 
could incite speech about sex only because they transf igured the power of 
the confessional in the clinic, claiming “scientif ic status for its hygienic 
control of sexuality only inasmuch as it  inherited the domain of the f lesh 
demarcated and  organized by ecclesiastical power” (AB 223). A convulsing 
nun in h/er relation to  institutional experts, Alexina is not condemned but 
rather studied.
Thus, Alexina’s historical moment does not allow h/er experience to be 
transported wholesale into the twentieth century as a veiled analogy for 
Foucault’s own experience of “abnormality”; they are not and cannot be parallel 
in this respect. The specificity of this historical moment furthermore compli-
cates even Butler’s more limited claim—that we should read Foucault and 
Herculine as parallel moments of confession—because Alexina is not guilty, 
not a juridical but a biopolitical subject. At this historical juncture, Alexina 
gives three confessions to priests, but these confessions serve as precursors to 
medical examination, subjecting h/er body to the demands of three doctors. 
Thus, Alexina could be better said to represent for Foucault a transitory figure 
in the shift from pastoral power—guidance toward salvation—to biopower, 
with its guidance toward the new modern ideal of health.
*
Having put away Butler’s claim that the text is a mere confession on Foucault’s 
part, we can now turn toward what I think is the more fecund reading of 
this strange text—namely, the significantly plural nature of the Herculine text 
as Foucault presents it. The splintered form is significant for understanding 
the complex ways in which bodies assume meaning, in an irreducible play of 
discourses and practices with embodied sensations. Butler’s critique focuses on 
the memoirs (and Foucault’s limited framing of them) without attention to the 
medical documents or the fiction that follows, thus missing the multiplicity 
of “truths” assembled there (cf. McWhorter 1999, Oksala 2011, Repo 2014). 
Oksala (2011) observes that these tensions between the parts of the text draw 
our attention to the gap, as she writes, “between the subject’s experience of his 
or her body and the scientific and legal discourses on its true sex” (218). The 
text then operates as social critique, motivated by this irreducible gap between 
subjective experience and objective descriptions; the normative and dominant 
discourses must be juxtaposed with subjugated knowledges in order to reveal 
the former as pathologizing, criminalizing, and moralizing discourses of sexu-
ality, for example. I argue that this critical movement between perspectives on 
a single life—from autobiographical to expert to fictional discourses—resonates 
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with Butler’s twenty-first-century ethical turn to consider the interpretive 
cultural frames through which some lives are rendered unrecognizable and, 
thus, placed outside the limits of the moral community.
Resonances between Foucault’s Herculine Barbin and the later Butler come to 
the fore in her ethical concern—in recent books such as Precarious Life (2004), 
Giving an Account of Oneself (2005), and Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? 
(2010)—for taking perspective from first-person narratives, considering how 
our frames of interpretation can preclude as well as enable lines of inquiry and 
can prohibit as well as justify our responses to what emerges in a given frame. 
Thus, Butler (2004) courageously argues—here in the post-9/11 context of U.S. 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the cultural and legal prohibitions on critical 
discourse about these wars—“It seems crucial to attend to this frame, since it 
decides, in a forceful way, what we can hear, whether a view will be taken as 
explanation or as exoneration, whether we can hear the difference, and abide 
by it” (5). In this context of framing, Butler is concerned with “de-centering” 
the predominance of first-person speech when we give an account of what 
has happened, shifting away from self-justification to consideration of the 
subject’s conditions of possibility—its constitutive relations, for which it cannot 
fully account—and to the ethical insights of the second-person (the “scene of 
address”) and in the third-person (where norms of intelligibility shape this 
exchange). Butler’s de-centered self is responsive to the world in the form of 
affects—hope and fear, suffering, joy, and rage—which are, in turn, mediated 
by interpretive frames that these affects can call upon or, at times, call into 
question (34). In addition to offering a critical rereading of Herculine Barbin 
alongside Judith Butler’s ethics, this paper observes that “curiosity” presents 
an especially powerful affect, in this way Butler describes, for sustaining and, 
at moments, also resisting modern biopower—what Foucault (1980) will call 
“curiosity-as-care.”
In their 2013 dialogue, Dispossession, Athena Athanasiou recollects for Butler 
her early claims in Bodies that Matter (1993) that a heterosexist symbolic order 
posits “the regulatory fiction” of a “pre-discursive materiality” of sex that blocks 
the possibility “of alternative imaginary schemas for constituting sites of eroto-
genic pleasure”; this is the pre-discursive sex for which she criticized Foucault’s 
Herculine (Butler and Athanasiou 2013, 50). Butler first ponders: “Indeed, who 
was the person who held these views?” Who was this Butler? Responding to 
Athanasiou, she reflects on Bodies that Matter—a book published by “Butler” 
twenty years earlier—in light of her more recent ethical and political writings; 
Butler then “recalls” the central insight of that work to Athanasiou: “The very 
determination of anatomical parts takes place through an interpretive scheme. 
The debates about how to determine sex, how to establish, for instance, an 
intersexual condition, depend on how one draws the line around the organ . . . 
our sexual organs are saturated with historical interpretations” (Butler and 
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Athanasiou 2013, 52). Butler recollects her earlier work through her more recent 
ethical concerns with interpretive schemes, and the violence of those schemes 
that draw rigid lines around bodily organs. She thus connects her early work to 
her more recent concerns with biopolitics as a public intellectual, engaging the 
administration of life and death and the political distribution of precarity.12 In 
this register, Butler invites her reader to return to her early work, to converse 
with that Butler in light of her more recent ethical emphasis. This later Butler 
enables a different reading of Foucault’s edited volume, in which a biopolitical 
frame of reference could not tolerate sexual ambiguity and thus drew violent 
lines on the body of Alexina Barbin. In conclusion, I extend this reading of 
Foucault’s Herculine in light of Butler’s ethical turn, concerning the violence 
of curiosity.
*
The violence of curiosity in Alexina’s story—so visceral in h/er medical 
reports—casts into relief the naturalized relation of sex and truth in 
modernity and, thus, might shift one’s perceptions in the historical present. 
For what purpose was Alexina probed, judged, secluded? To correct an error? 
H/er body is a casualty of the condensation of administrative power that was 
historically intertwined with the medical examination of life. Repo (2014) aptly 
observes: “The process of examining and organising the insides of creatures 
and determining their life-sustaining functions positioned scientists to erect 
classifications and cartographies of newly exposed organic structures. . . . The 
very organs of bodies were territorialized by biopower” (83). This is how both 
Chesnet (who examined and deemed Alexina a man in 1860) and Goujon (who 
did the autopsy in 1868) could both acknowledge the bodily ambiguity before 
them and deny it by declaring a hidden reality, a true sex. These studies of 
Alexina-turned-Abel’s body generated hopes of a new teratology, a handbook 
of monstrous diagnoses to pinpoint every possible anomaly. In Goujon’s post-
mortem study, he insists—with certainty beyond any demonstration—that 
“hermaphroditism does not exist in man and the higher animals” (HB 139), 
and claims that Alexina must be male because h/er sexual organs follow 
predominately male functions, disguised though they are by deceptive bodily 
appearances (HB 143). Goujon comes up against the logical impossibility of 
what he sees and claims this evidence is a play of illusion, simply false. Can 
the contours of a body be false? Under the gaze of medical curiosity, Alexina’s 
ambiguities are flattened to the binary switch of truth, while the idiosyncrasies 
of h/er anatomy are subject to the most thorough of investigations.
The excessive speech of doctors examining Alexina’s body is mirrored in 
h/er silences and explicit refusals to describe these encounters, expressing 
discomfort, pain, and shame at their invasiveness. In those gaps and silences, 
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Alexina’s memoirs refuse to rearticulate the anatomical details that would 
fill the pages of so many expert records; s/he describes h/er examinations 
in sparing detail. Among the most sustained scenes of medical observation, 
Alexina depicts h/er encounter with Dr. T., whom s/he saw for h/er chronic 
severe pelvic pain only at Sara’s insistence; here, s/he depicts his authoritative 
privilege and h/er own discomfort: “As it is known, a doctor enjoys certain 
privileges with a sick person that nobody dreams of contesting” (HB 68). Wary 
of his violent curiosity, Alexina notes that he was “full of interest, while giving 
vent to muffled exclamations . . . ‘My God! Is it possible?’” S/he continues:
His face was distorted, betraying extraordinary excitement. “I beg you to leave 
me alone,” I said to him. “You are killing me! . . .” His hand was already 
slipping under my sheet and coming to a stop at the sensitive place. It pressed 
upon it several times, as if to find there the solution to a difficult problem. It 
did not leave off at that point!!! He had found the explanation he was looking 
for! But it was easy to see that it exceeded all his expectations! (HB 68–69)
Dr. T. located the “truth” of Alexina’s sex only by tuning out the protestations 
of h/er voice. Yet, while eager to solve the puzzle of h/er body for the satisfac-
tion of dispelling ambiguity, Dr. T. had no interest in following through to 
oversee h/er reassignment. Understanding the gravity of the situation, Dr. T. 
felt content to send Alexina away from the convent as fast as possible without 
disclosing his report to local authorities, “believing that he thus released himself 
from all responsibility” (HB 70). Fearing exposure and hoping that h/er local 
priest would ease these fears, Alexina went to h/er mother, who took h/er to 
Monseigneur de B., who then sent h/er to Dr. H. (i.e., Chesnet); between 
this doctor and this priest, the examination was complete. S/he describes h/er 
encounter with Dr. H. as animated by a similarly violent curiosity:
It displeased me to see him initiate himself into my dearest secrets, and I 
answered in not very restrained terms certain of his remarks that seemed to 
me to be a violation. He said to me then, “Here you must regard me not only 
as a doctor but also as a confessor. I must not only see for myself, I must also 
know everything you can tell me. . . .” I shall excuse myself from entering 
here into the minute details of this examination, after which science conceded 
that it was convinced. It now remained for him to bring about the correction 
of an error that had been committed beyond the bounds of all the ordinary 
rules. (HB 78)
In the pronouncements of Dr. H. (Chesnet), having initiated himself into 
(violated) Alexina’s “dearest secrets” and insisted that he holds the power 
of doctor and confessor at once, Alexina’s very embodiment must be 
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“corrected” and her personal history thoroughly confessed. In the aftermath 
of these examinations, Alexina found h/erself stripped of all former relations 
and achievements, reassigned to the male identity of “Abel,” and no less 
misunderstood.
Within this modern paradigm of sex and truth, ambiguous bodies could not 
rest unexamined; the expert “had, as it were, to strip the body of its anatomical 
deceptions” (HB viii–ix). Foucault’s preface continues that this suspicion of 
“sexual irregularity” as somehow fictional persists, for instance, in attitudes 
that “tolerate” homosexuality but nevertheless consider it, consciously or 
subconsciously, “a manner of acting that is not adequate to reality.” Today, 
Foucault writes in the late 1970s, the dominant culture can tolerate queerness—
“we may be prepared to admit that a ‘passive’ man, a ‘virile’ woman, people 
of the same sex who love one another, do not seriously impair the established 
order”—and yet may tacitly maintain a sense of error in these presentations, 
not as criminal but rather as chimerical and illusory pleasures (HB x). Here, 
Foucault pushes against the designation of an error in an economy of truth 
that renders some lives invisible and, in the words of Butler’s recent ethics, 
ungrievable.
*
Perhaps one of the strangest elements of Herculine is the inclusion of a fictional 
account about Alexina’s life—Oscar Panizza’s 1893 novella, “A Scandal at the 
Convent.” The novella inexplicably places Alexina’s narrative in the early 1830s 
(before h/er birth) and yet reframes it through later discourses of hysteria and 
homosexuality, anachronistic to the pre-biopolitical episteme of Alexina’s 1860 
France. As with the material from the medical and legal dossier, Panizza is 
absent from Butler’s analysis of the Herculine text; his fictional narrative is, 
furthermore, not among the options of possible “parallel lives” of “Herculine” 
(GT 129). And yet Foucault himself explicitly pairs the two narratives, 
mediated by the dossier, as artifacts of the shifting “truth” of sex in the late 
nineteenth century. The pairing is not arbitrary. Foucault finds “something 
surprising about this imaginary encounter between the little provincial French 
girl of indeterminate sex and the frenzied psychiatrist who was later to die in 
the asylum at Bayreuth” (HB xv).13 Panizza’s fiction offers “a remarkable echo” 
of Alexina’s memoirs, not simply because he retells the story—as a psychiatrist 
living in France as well as Germany in the early 1880s, it is not surprising that 
he encountered h/er medico-legal records—but because of the way Panizza 
portrays his fictional “Alexina Besnard,” known as the “Schoolmistress,” in the 
context of his own descent into madness. Why does Foucault place these texts, 
a memoir and a novella, together? And, what is this “something surprising,” 
this remarkable echo?
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I argue that the echo follows from a theatrical reframing of this historical 
narrative, which captures—obliquely—the violence of the desire to know 
Alexina’s true sex. Panizza takes two big liberties with Alexina’s memoirs, 
shifting the perspective out of the first-person to that of an all-knowing 
narrator and, furthermore, retelling the story of Alexina’s “discovery”— 
historically the work of authoritative men—through hysterical responses of 
young women at the convent, disgusted by an apparent lesbianism (two girls 
found in bed together) that later becomes intelligible as a secret heterosexu-
ality (having corrected the “error”).14 Panizza’s novella retells the story of the 
memoirs from the outside, presenting Alexina “only in the fleeting profiles 
of what others see,” as a “shadowy figure . . . who vanishes at the end of the 
narrative, leaving no trace” (HB xvi). Thus, although Panizza offers the story 
from a bird’s-eye view, his ending refuses to “fix [Alexina] with a suicide,” 
refuses to depict h/er objectification in autopsy (HB xvi). Rather, tension 
builds throughout the novella, which culminates in a pitchfork-wielding mob 
banging at the doors to the convent, demanding the devil and his bride, i.e., 
a witch. Here, Alexina is paradoxically “hanged” for her abnormality in a 
strange, impossible position between the biopolitical figure of the hysterical 
lesbian, on the one hand, and the juridical guilt-laden figure of the witch, on 
the other. With this desire at once to pin down a sickness of the present in the 
past, and a demon of the past in the future, I believe what Panizza’s fiction (via 
Foucault’s choice for inclusion within the Herculine text) signals to us, far from 
any conceivable attempt at confession, is the complex nature of any attempt, 
at any point in history, to pin down the truth of Barbin’s subjectivity. Thus, 
the scandalous star of this late-nineteenth-century stage is not Alexina in any 
possible or parallel life, but, rather, the violence of curiosity itself.
*
Rather than a marginal or sentimental project, as the early Butler suggests, 
I have argued that Herculine Barbin is continuous with History of Sexuality 
Volume One in its concern with the affective framing of la volonté de savoir. 
Foucault’s juxtaposition of memoirs, medical and legal records, and novella in 
Herculine is not incidental; this assemblage of “fact” and “fable” disrupts the 
“truth” of sex and dramatizes the violence of curiosity to know this “truth.” 
This curiosity grew violent particularly when it purported to be neutral and 
disinterested, when Alexina’s doctors, engrossed in the sublime oddity of h/er 
intersex body, seem unable to hear h/er cries of pain in their search for “truth.”
How might this curiosity animating the will-to-know be productively 
rerouted, such that the desire to understand could mean something other than 
the desire to control? Curiosity finds its root in the Latin curiosus, an etymology 
suggesting diligence toward one’s object of interest, obscured in contemporary 
18   philoSophia
philoSOPHIA_7.1_01.indd Page 18 01/04/17  8:4 AM
connotations of curiosities as gratuitous and invasive. In an anonymous 1980 
interview, “The Masked Philosopher,” Foucault envisioned a mode of atten-
tion he named curiosity-as-care, motivated by “a readiness to find strange and 
singular what surrounds us, a certain relentlessness to break up our famil-
iarities and to regard otherwise the same things,” importantly, with care for 
“what exists and what could exist” (Foucault 1997 [1980], 325). Here, we might 
furthermore find the later Butler helpful; Butler (2002) writes that Foucault 
offers a model of critique as a practice of virtue, exposing the limits of the 
background—the “epistemological horizon”—through which one thinks and 
feels “an ethics which is not fulfilled merely by following objectively formulated 
rules or laws . . . [but through] a critical relation to those norms, one which, for 
Foucault, takes shape as a specific stylization of morality” (Butler 2002, 214). 
She continues that one stylizes oneself “at the limits of established being,” the 
limits of what it is possible.
In Herculine Barbin, then, Foucault engaged the violence of biopolitical 
curiosity as he also offered the reader a set of materials for genealogically inter-
rogating their own presumptions about the “truth” of sex. Reading Herculine we 
may ask: Which of these voices can be properly described as factual? If these 
are, ultimately, irreconcilable accounts, then the “truth” found in this text will 
not be the revelation of a hidden secret but a different kind of revelation. In 
the juxtaposition of a memoir and a novella with medical records, Foucault’s 
Herculine invites the reader to wonder what it is about bodily ambiguity that 
inspires the violence of experts. In the gaps, fractures, and silences of Herculine, 
Foucault offers a chance to exercise a different mode of curiosity, one that cares 
for what exists and what could exist in all its ambiguity.
—Florida Atlantic University
Notes
1. This volume, following Foucault’s 1977 “Lives of Infamous Men,” also considered
those imprisoned at the request of their families by lettres de cachet under the
Ancien Régime in France.
2. McWhorter (1999) begins by informing her readers that her account of Herculine
Barbin, as a “counter-memory” in multiple voices, finds little resonance in the
secondary literature (200).
3. Various scholars (e.g., Kramer 2015, Stark 2014, Culbertson 2013) have generatively
explored Butler’s turn to ethics in the years since September 11, 2001, though argu-
ably her work from early theories of performativity to the more recent concept of
precarity shows sustained commitment to addressing marginality and dispossession.
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Watson (2012) argues that Butler’s “vulnerability politics”—to overcome the 
 differential distribution of precarity through recognizing shared precariousness—is 
utopian and requires a richer analysis of the global economy; yet, Butler offers an 
important ontological insight about our fundamental relationality and a redefinition 
of the body—away from the bounded liberal individual—as inherently social.
4. Here, I understand “power” for Foucault to signify enabling and constraining
networks, a “moving substrate of force relations” deployed from below and above.
I understand “discourse” to entail the realm in which “power and knowledge
are joined together,” a fractured realm of stories we tell about ourselves, and the
operations these stories conceal. Yet, discourses are tactically polyvalent; what was
once an instrument of power can be “a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of
resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy” (HS 101).
5. Amy Allen (2006) persuasively argues that Butler’s theory of subjection conflates
dependency and subordination through the volatile middle term of “power,”
describing one’s passionate attachment to norms of intelligibility. While compelled
by Butler’s claim that our vulnerability to subordination may bring us to settle for
those forms of recognition and identification available to us, this does not mean
“that subjectivation is always subordinating” (207).
6. See, for instance, Rich 1994; Schilt and Westbrook 2009.
7. Jemima Repo (2014), 86 and 78; Repo’s insight for feminist theory going forward
is that a biopolitical genealogy of “sex” enables us to overcome the nature/culture
split that Butler’s theory of gender performativity reverses but ultimately main-
tains, understanding that “the sex-bound idea of gender as we know it today” is a
recent product of the twentieth century, generated by sexologists and feminists;
Repo writes: “To examine gender genealogically and biopolitically, as Foucault did
with sexuality, we must examine how ‘relations of power had established’ gender
‘as a possible target’ for the governance of life” (Repo 2014, 87).
8. Specifically, Mak finds that Foucault “confusingly conflates a biological and a
psychological ‘inner’ truth of sex” by placing such significance on Barbin’s physical
“discovery,” arguing that the 1860s did not yet have a concept of modern sexual
identity in which one’s “sex” expressed the “truth” of the “self ” (66).
9. One notable exception is Chloë Taylor’s consideration of Butler’s critique in light
of her 2005 monograph, Giving an Account of Oneself. Taylor (2010) notes that
Butler’s early critique “seems to be a case of championing the sincerity of an other,
of extracting or providing a confession which was not given,” though Butler’s later
work clearly observes that “demanding a confession of another which would fulfill
our desire to know him” cancels both the freedom of the other as well as our desire
to know that other (177). Yet, distinct from my own reading, Taylor “is inclined
to agree with Judith Butler’s claim that Foucault romanticizes this text,” though
she observes, more affirmatively, that here Foucault “thought that it was possible
to say something about oneself, one’s past, one’s childhood, one’s pleasures and
miseries, without fixing oneself as such” (ibid.).
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10. See, in addition to McLaren 2002, for instance: Alcoff 1988, Deveaux 1994, Fraser
1989, Hartsock 1990, McNay 1992, Moi 1985, as well as defenses against these
critiques by Huffer 2009 and Sawicki 1994. See also Hekman (ed.) 1996 and
Ramazanoglu (ed.) 1993.
11. Colin Koopman spoke on the genealogical significance of this decade, the 1860s,
at SPEP 2013 in Eugene, Oregon. Thanks to Colin for his helpful insights
early in the formulation of this project, and for pointing me toward the work of
Jemima Repo!
12. Butler (2010) distinguishes the existential and shared state of precariousness from
the biopolitical distribution of precarity, “that politically-induced condition in
which certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of
support and become differentially exposed to injury, violence, and death” (25).
While we cannot universalize the recognition of each person in his or her speci-
ficity, by recognizing our shared precariousness we might extend the scope of lives
that matter, i.e., grievable lives (28).
13. Panizza would later be committed to prison for penning antireligious works and
expelled from his refuge in Switzerland for an “outrage” on a female minor (HB xv).
14. Panizza’s Alexina is smarter than the other girls at the convent school, called
the “Schoolmistress” by her peers, disgusted by feminine needlework, and drawn
instead to mathematics (HB 174). Thus, in his novella, Panizza interprets h/er
as a man in women’s clothes, and the mob reaction against h/er is clarified by
Alexina’s “real” identity.
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